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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRAVELERS EXPRESS COMPANY, 
INC., a Minnesota corporation, 
Plaintiff 
Respondent. 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, LINN C. BAKER, 
in his capacity as Treasurer 
of the State of Utah, and 
RICHARD G. JENSEN, in his 
capacity as auditor of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants 
Appellants. 
CASE NO. 19216 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action for a declaratory judgment 
to determine if certain uncashed money orders issued by Plaintiff 
were subject to the Utah Unclaimed Property Act. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Summary Judgment was entered by the District Court in 
favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on cross motions for 
summary judgment. 
-1-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Travelers Express Company, Inc. ("Travelers11) is a 
Minnesota corporation engaged in the business of selling money 
orders throughout the United States. Travelers has been selling 
its money orders in Utah, either directly or through its 
predecessor, since 1959. An overwhelming majority of these money 
orders have been presented for payment in due course. However, 
some of the money orders have never been cashed, presumably due to 
loss or destruction of the money order, or simple neglect by the 
owner. 
In 1957, Utah adopted the Uniform Disposition of 
Unclaimed Property Act (the "ActH), which is set out at UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 78-44-1, et seq. Under Section 78-44-2, any "sum payable" 
on a money order is "presumed abandoned" after seven years. 
Generally, abandoned property must be paid over to the State. 
However, the State's rights are only derivative from those of the 
owner, and if the owner's rights have been extinguished, then 
there is no "sum payable." On the understanding that the Statute 
of Limitations barred all claims of the money order purchasers, 
Travelers, at first, did not report these uncashed money orders to 
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the State. In response to the State's demand, however, Travelers 
filed its initial report on October 31, 1977, under protest, as 
to all sums then held, and brought this suit for refund and 
declaratory judgment. Subsequent reports were filed October 30, 
1978, October 30, 1979, October 30, 1980, October 30, 1981 and 
October 29, 1982 and Travelers paid to the State, under protest, 
the sums reported. Both parties stipulated that Travelers1 
payment of the sums did not constitute a waiver of any rights, 
including any defense to payment based upon any statute of 
limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CREATES A 
VESTED PROPERTY INTEREST THAT CANNOT BE DESTROYED BY 
STATUTE. 
An action against the issuer of a money order to recover 
the amount payable thereon is a contract action based upon the 
issuer's agreement with the purchaser at the time of issue that 
the issuer would pay out the sum received from the purchaser. 
This cause of action accrues when the money order is issued and 
is subject to six year limitations period of UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 78-12-23, which governs any action on a "contract, obligation 
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing." See 54 
C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 146; Annotation, 71 A.L.R.2d 284; 
Developments in the Law—Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 
1177, 1212 (1950) (limitations period commences to run upon the 
issuance of a demand instrument.) 
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The expiration of a limitations period on an action to 
recover property creates a vested right to the property in the 
holder, and operates to extinguish the right of the original owner 
to require payment. See, e.g., McGuire v. University of Utah 
Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786, 780 (Utah 1979) (running of statute 
of limitations on an action creates a vested right which cannot 
be impaired without denying due process of law); Del Monte 
Corporation v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah 1978) ("if the 
statute has run on a cause of action, so that it is dead, it 
cannot be revived"); Blue Cross of Northern California v. Cory, 
120 Cal. App. 3d 723, 742, 174 Cal. Rptr. 901, 912-13 (1981) 
("the running of the statute of limitations on a claim before the 
effective date of the UPL [Unclaimed Property Law], as between the 
holder and the owner remained available as a defense") (emphasis 
supplied); Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. Department of 
Revenue, 78 Wash. 2d 961, 481 P.2d 556 (1971) (recognizing statute 
of limitations defense to state's claim under its abandoned 
property law.) 
In this case, the period of limitations on a private 
action by the original owner of a money order against Travelers 
is six years. Consequently, the title to any sum payable by 
Travelers on an unclaimed money order vests in Travelers six years 
after the issuance of the money order, and there is no "sum 
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payable" on a money order issued in Utah seven years after 
issuance, which is the time period under the Act when the payable 
sum is "presumed abandoned." 
II. THE RIGHTS OF THE STATE UNDER THE UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT 
ARE DERIVATIVE FROM THE RIGHTS OF THE OWNERS OF ABANDONED 
PROPERTY DUE TO THE CUSTODIAL NATURE OF THE ACT. 
It is well-established that the rights of a state under 
an abandoned property law are derivative from those of the 
original owner of the property. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. 
New Jersey, 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950), affirmed, 341 U.S. 428 
(1951); South Carolina Tax Commission v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 266 S.C. 34, 221 S.E.2d 522 (1975); Bank of America v. 
Cranston, 252 Cal. App. 2d 208, 60 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1967); Pacific 
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 70 Wash. 2d 
961, 481 P.2d 556 (1971) ; Insurance Co* of North America v. 
Knight, 8 111. App. 3d 871, 291 N.E.2d 40, 44 (1972), cert. 
dismissed, 414 U.S. 804 (1973). Therefore, if, at the time a 
state seeks to take custody of property under an abandoned 
property statute, the true owner of the property no longer would 
have a right to recover it, the state also is barred because under 
the common law, the expiration of a period of limitations on a 
cause of action creates a vested right which cannot be destroyed. 
The conclusion that the effect of the Unclaimed 
Property Act can be superseded by the running of 
-5-
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the statute of limitations is consistent with the 
derivative nature of the Uniform Actf discussed 
earlier. Once the statute of limitations 
precludes action by the owner, the State has 
no higher claim to require the fund or other 
property to be handed over to its custody. 
Utah ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Association, No. 17902 
(Utah Sup. Ct. filed June 3, 1983). 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE RUNNING OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SUPERSEDES THE EFFECT OF UTAHfS 
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT. 
As indicated in Defendant's brief, both parties have 
stipulated that the only question pending on appeal is whether 
the aforementioned six year statute of limitations precludes the 
Treasurer from requiring reports and transfer of funds under 
Utah's version of the Unclaimed Property Act. A recent decision 
by this Court, rendered subsequent to the filing of Defendant's 
brief, is dispositive of the question and affirms the District 
Court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 
Section 16 of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed 
Property Act treats unclaimed property as being subject to the Act 
even though the applicable state statute of limitations has run 
prior to the date of presumed abandonment. 8 U.L.A. § 16 
commissioners' note (1972). In Utah ex rel. Baker v. 
Intermountain Farmers Association suprar this Court recognized 
-6-
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that the Utah Legislature deliberately omitted S 16-from the Act 
in order to avoid possible constitutional objections based on the 
statute of limitations. 
Utah did not enact § 16 of the Uniform Act. 
The omission was deliberate. The Bill originally 
introduced in the Legislature embodied the entire 
Uniform Act, but § 16 was subsequently omitted in 
an amendment put forward by the sponsor of the 
Bill. Utah S.B. 77, 32d Leg. Sess., 1957 Senate 
Journal 83, 344-46, 614. The State offers no 
explanation or construction of this omission. 
The Cooperative argues that this deliberate 
omission of a provision that would have directed 
that unclaimed property be reported and paid over 
to the State notwithstanding the expiration of a 
period of limitations establishes the legislative 
intent that the running of a statute of 
limitations should supersede the effect of the 
Unclaimed Property Act. For this and the other 
reasons cited below, we agree. 
The legislative history suggests the reason 
for omitting § 16—to avoid doubts about its 
constitutionality as to claims already barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
Utah ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Association, supra. 
Further support of the position that the six year 
limitation remains operative despite adoption of the Unclaimed 
Property Act is found in the language of certain provisions of the 
Act as promulgated by the Utah Legislature. This Court has 
acknowledged the persuasiveness of such language and concluded 
that it serves to indicate the legislature's intent to allow the 
statute of limitations to supersede the effect of the Act. 
-7-
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This omission is especially significant in jview 
of other references to the statute of limitations 
in the Act as adopted. The Legislature enacted 
without change the Uniform Act provision 
requiring the holder to notify the owner before 
reporting the unclaimed property "if the owner's 
claim has not been barred by the statute of 
limitations . . . ." S 78-44-11(5). In 
addition, in contrast to its deletion of S 16, 
the Legislature amended the Uniform Act to add 
a provision that an owner of property or the 
proceeds of property that has been delivered to 
the State can claim the same from the Statef and 
•[n]o statute of limitations shall bar the filing 
of a claim.1 § 78-44-18. . . . This result is 
also consistent with the language of § 5: once 
the statute of limitations has run, the 
distribution or other sum is no longer "held or 
owing by a business association . . . to a . . . 
participating patron of a cooperative," 
§ 78-44-5, and therefore need not be reported 
or turned over to the custody of the state. 
Utah ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Association, supra. 
A final indication that the legislature did not intend 
the Act to eviscerate the six year limitation is found in a 
regulation issued by the State Treasurer shortly after the Act was 
adopted, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-44-25. This regulation 
demonstrates that the initial administrative construction was that 
the Act did not apply to payment of funds barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Change of Ownership Rights. When the 
owner's right to claim property held by another
 { 
has been barred either by a statute of 
limitations, the contract under which the 
property was held, or under the terms of the 
instrument, or the law under which entitlement 
-8-
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arose, prior to the time the holder is required 
to report and deliver abandoned property to the 
State Treasurer under this act, it is not 
necessary to report such property. 
Rules and Regulations of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed 
Property Act administered by the Utah State Treasurer, Rule 10, 
quoted in Utah ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 
supra. 
In summary, Defendants1 argument that general rules of 
statutory construction prove the legislature intended the Act to 
supplant the six year limitation is inconsistent with the 
legislative history of the Act. The case of Utah ex rel. Baker v. 
Intermountain Farming Association, supra., is dispositive of the 
stipulated question and provides clear and convincing evidence 
that the legislature did not intend the statute of limitations to 
become inoperative as a consequence of the adopted Act. This 
means the applicable statute of limitations extinguishes the 
rights to payment of any sums on the money orders, thus preventing 
there from being any "sum payable" on Travelers' money orders 
which could escheat to the state under the Unclaimed Property Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
decision of the court below. 
DATED this day of July, 1983. 
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